Worst-case scenarios happen. We must prepare for them and be able to respond.
N atural disasters and man-made tragedies have always been a feature of life on Earth, but the world does seem to have become particularly hazardous of late. A year ago, an explosion on a BP drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico killed 11 workers and triggered a leak that spewed more than 4 million barrels of oil into the ocean. As we report on page 152, scientists are still struggling to track the possible long-term effects on the region. Meanwhile, halfway across the world, Japan is reeling from the triple crisis that killed tens of thousands, caused at least US$200 billion in direct damages and continues to spread radiation into the skies and sea.
The two disasters are of different magnitude and have very different causes. But they do have one thing in common: overconfidence in the strength of human systems and decisions. O ne month after the earthquake and tsunami hit Japan, there is still no clear picture of the further hazard posed by the wrecked nuclear reactors and spent fuel ponds at the Fukushima nuclear power plant (see page 146), and monitoring of fallout remains patchy. To improve the situation, better data, in more user-friendly forms, and more sophisticated analyses are essential. Compared with the 1979 Three Mile Island accident or the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, there is certainly much more information available about this latest nuclear accident -largely thanks to the Internet and online media. Japan's science ministry, and other bodies, have issued reams of data, including daily environmental radiation measurements -an admirable feat, given that the Japanese authorities are also having to deal with the huge aftermath of the quake and tsunami.
But as Peter Sandman, a risk consultant based in Princeton, New Jersey (www.psandman.com/whatsnew.htm), points out, the authorities have failed badly to forewarn the public of a series of events that they must have known were likely to happen. This has resulted in nasty surprises such as radioactive pollution of the sea (see page 145), foods and tap water -as well as this week's upgrading of the accident to level 7, the highest on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale and matched only by Chernobyl. As a result, many people now do not trust the authorities to tell them if the situation is likely to worsen, sapping public confidence.
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which runs the Fukushima plant, has also on at least four occasions had to retract as incorrect its findings on the amount and composition of radionuclides in areas in and around the plant, or on reactor parameters. This has created uncertainty and public mistrust in the company's monitoring abilities. In its defence, damaged plant instrumentation means that key data on events inside the reactors are sometimes missing or unreliable. Even so, the most complete and credible publicly available analyses of possible reactor-event scenarios have come not from Japan, but from outside scientists, nuclear-reactor makers and regulatory authorities.
Similarly, it is pertinent to ask why, so far, the only detailed publicly available forecasts of the direction and concentration of atmospheric radio nuclide plumes have come from overseas agencies. The Japanese almost certainly have data that would allow much higher-resolution forecast maps of Fukushima and the surrounding areas. Although the Japanese authorities are releasing data daily on radiation levels in the air, soil and water, these are scattered across multiple, individual web pages. This uncoordinated approach was excusable in the early days, but data collection and presentation urgently need to improve. The authorities have also failed to provide vital context on how these exposure rates translate (or not) into what matters to people, such as health effects, and where they make farming impossible. The recurring narrative that this or that radiation dose is as much as would be given by an X-ray or a CT scan doesn't cut it, as health effects, for example, depend most on accumulated doses over long times.
A little knowledge
The Japanese authorities have done well in releasing copious amounts of crude data on the nuclear crisis. But it is imperative for the data to be provided in more meaningful and user-friendly ways.
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Information on fallout distribution made public by the government and TEPCO also lacks basic metadata, such as the latitude and longitude of sampling points or the sampling protocols used, and results are presented as static PDFs from which researchers cannot easily extract the data. As a result, it is next to impossible for academic researchers and others to compile and map the daily reports and gain a better picture of the situation and of changes over time and space. The Japanese authorities, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other bodies with relevant information must present it as dynamic data and highresolution maps that also show day-to-day variation, total net cumulative soil deposition and where hotspots are, and as models of what's happening overall rather than just spot counts.
Data analysis should also not be left to governments alone. Researchers are rightly calling for an independent group to process the data and publish evidence-based risk assessments. They also want data in machine-readable formats, such as spreadsheets, databases and spatial data formats. This would unleash the diverse creativity of academic researchers, journalists, software geeks and mappers, who are often better equipped, and more agile than governments and international agencies, to present data online in timely, informative and compelling ways. To convert raw data into high-quality, user-friendly forms is not a luxury, but essential for helping to build public trust. 
Universal truths
Rejection of broad commonality in structure of languages has implications for all sciences. S ince at least the days of Aristotle, a search for universal principles has characterized the scientific enterprise. In some ways, this quest for commonalities defines science: without it, there is no underlying order and pattern, merely as many explanations as there are things in the world. Newton's laws of motion, the oxygen theory of combustion and Darwinian evolution each bind a host of different phenomena into a single explicatory framework.
In physics, one approach takes this impulse for unification to its extreme, and seeks a theory of everything -a single generative equation for all we see. It is becoming less clear, however, that such a theory would be a simplification, given the proliferation of dimensions and universes that it might entail. Nonetheless, unification of sorts remains a major goal.
This tendency in the natural sciences has long been evident in the social sciences too. Here, Darwinism seems to offer justification, for if all humans share common origins, it seems reasonable to suppose that cultural diversity could also be traced to more constrained beginnings. Just as the bewildering variety of human courtship rituals might all be considered to be forms of sexual selection, perhaps the world's languages, music, social and religious customs and even history are governed by universal features. To filter out what is contingent and unique from what is shared might enable us to understand how complex cultural behaviour arose and what guides it in evolutionary or cognitive terms.
That, at least, is the hope. But a comparative study of linguistic traits published online today (M. Dunn et al. Nature doi:10.1038/nature09923; 2011) supplies a reality check. Russell Gray at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, and his colleagues consider the evolution of grammars in the light of two previous attempts to find universality in language.
The most famous of these efforts was initiated by Noam Chomsky, who postulated that humans are born with an innate language-acquisition capacity -a brain module or modules specialized for language -that dictates a universal grammar. A few generative rules are then sufficient to unfold the entire fundamental structure of a language, which is why children can learn it so quickly. Languages would diversify through changes to the 'parameter settings' of the generative rules.
The second, by Joshua Greenberg, takes a more empirical approach to universality, identifying traits (particularly in word order) shared by many languages, which are considered to represent biases that result from cognitive constraints. Chomsky's and Greenberg's are not the only theories on the table for how languages evolve, but they make the strongest predictions about universals.
Gray and his colleagues have put them to the test using phylogenetic methods to examine four family trees that between them represent more than 2,000 languages. A generative grammar should show patterns of language change that are independent of the family tree or the pathway tracked through it, whereas Greenbergian universality predicts strong co-dependencies between particular types of word-order relations (and not others). Neither of these patterns is borne out by the analysis, suggesting that the structures of the languages are lineage-specific and not governed by universals.
This does not mean that cognitive constraints are irrelevant, or that there are no other universals dictated by communication efficiency. It is surely inevitable that cognition sets limits on, say, word length. But such 'universals' seem likely to be relatively trivial features of languages, just as may be the case for putative universals in music and other aspects of culture.
The conclusion? We should perhaps learn the lesson of Darwinism: a 'universal' mechanism of adaptation says little in itself about how a particular feature got to be the way it is, or about how it works. This truth has dawned on physicists too: universal equations are all very well, but the world actually consists of particular solutions, and these are generally the result of contingent history. One size does not always fit all. ■
In the case of the petroleum industry, companies pushed into deep-water locations without doing sufficient research or making the investments needed to prevent -and respond to -problems that might arise from drilling in such an extreme environment. And the US government did not have sufficient oversight of the industry. Both the government and the petroleum companies seemed to think that there was little risk of the type of blowout that caused the accident. "The Deepwater Horizon disaster exhibits the costs of a culture of complacency, " concluded the presidential commission charged with investigating the spill.
Similar overconfidence ruled parts of the seismological community in Japan. Official maps of the seismic hazard in the country draw heavily on records of past earthquakes. But because no great earthquake had struck off the coast of Sendai in recent centuries, the hazard assessments did not take such a large event into account (see Nature doi:10.1038/nature10105; 2011, and Nature 471, 556-557; 2011) . Some researchers were more cautious. They pointed to geodetic data showing that strain was increasing in the region and to geological signs of a tsunami in 869 that was much larger than anything more recent. But such evidence did not undermine seductive faith in the official quake risk-assessment method, which turned out to be fundamentally flawed. In addition, the designers of the Fukushima nuclear power plant failed to adequately prepare for the possibility that their back-up generators would fail, and misjudged how hard it would be to re-establish electrical power after a tsunami.
One lesson that must be taken from these tragic events is that many of our critical systems are simply unable to withstand situations that are entirely possible. Think the oil and gas industry has learned the lessons of Deepwater Horizon? Don't hold your breath. The rush to exploit the resources exposed by dwindling Arctic ice cover seems riddled with the same dismissal of legitimate risks of rare but plausible events with terrible consequences (see page 162).
Such critical systems -and society at large -must be made more resilient: the core elements of society need to function even when disasters strike. And many fields, ranging from seismic engineering to urban planning for the impacts of climate change, are working to build up this resilience. In practice, this means strengthening crucial buildings and other infrastructure, developing back-up power systems and planning for multiple tiers of failures. It also requires better training for local communities and government officials in how to respond. Earthquake and tsunami drills are common in places such as California and Japan, but other regions, too, need to engage in these and other types of exercises that simulate massive oil spills, nuclear crises, terrorist attacks and hurricanes, to name a few.
On 28 April, almost two million people in the United States will take part in the Great Central US Shakeout by responding as if a large earthquake had taken place in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, which 200 years ago produced the strongest historical quakes in the conterminous United States. This relatively simple public exercise will be followed up a few weeks later by a more detailed drill involving federal, state and local managers.
Such simulations are essential to probe emergency plans for weaknesses before the real hazards come along, which they will. ■ "Critical systems must be made more resilient."
